This chapter considers whether and how cognizance is given to the value of dignity in
Introduction
Rationing of health and social care within the Kingdom (UK) is an accepted reality today.
1 As such a growing body of case law has developed giving clear guidance on the legal principles and rights that the UK Courts look to when questions of availability and access to health and social care are brought before them. 2 The case of McDonald v UK 3 however highlights how limited the approach to justiciability is within the courts, which further raises questions in the wider debate on rationing in the context of a growing elderly population and finite resources. 4 While the courts, in the Mc Donald litigation, 5 were prepared to review the procedural aspects associated with the decision making on the care provided, they were reluctant to assess in substantive terms the impact of the decision on the individual. 6 Although dignity was acknowledged as being relevant throughout the various stages of the litigation there was limited discussion of the concept. This chapter questions whether and how greater consideration could have been given to the concept of dignity as understood with reference to the disciplines of health and law, 7 including Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
In spite of the relationship between health and dignity being clearly acknowledged in the international right to health there is limited guidance on what dignity means within the jurisprudence on Article 12 ICESCR.
8
However empirical research on health and law has the potential to develop the concept as a standard in law. The concept has been increasingly referred to within professional guidance 9 and empirical research 10 and within a growing body of literature 11 and case law. 12 This is a body of evidence the courts could refer to in the context of access to health and social care litigation and which they can contribute to by embedding dignity as a value that ought to be considered in decision making on access to social and health care entitlements.
7 C Foster Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (2011) Hart Publishing: Oxford Chapter 5 -7. Foster highlights examples of primary research on health care (which focused on trying to understand the meaning of dignity and the factors which impacted it) and reviews of case law looking at how the courts have approached dignity. 8 N. Jacobson N 'Dignity and Health: A Review' Social Science and Medicine (2007) (64) p 292.
The McDonald Litigation.
McDonald v United Kingdom involved a challenge 13 against the decision (and care plan) made by a local borough council under their statutory duties. 14 The local council had a duty to assess the client's needs, make provision for those needs 'and in doing so [they] may take account of their resources.' 15 As a result of a stroke, Ms
McDonald suffered from limited mobility and frequency of urination: this contributed to her being at risk of falling. 16 She needed assistance to access the toilet both during the day and the night. Her request for night -time assistance was rejected by the council, and alternative care was eventually put in place, which was the provision of plan were considered to be 'elimination of risk of injury' and 'a desire for independence and privacy', both of which could be met with the provision of incontinence pads. 18 Lord Brown found that there was no interference with Article 8
ECHR, but stated that even if an interference with the right to family and private life was identified, it could be justified under Article 8(2) ECHR. 19 The ECtHR did find that there was an interference with Article 8, however save in respect to a violation The criticisms of a focus on procedure, a reluctance to consider 'normative values' or minimum standards and judicial deference in the context of resource allocation questions are part of the wider debate on the extent to which courts should be involved in challenges relevant to social justice. 29 O Cinniede suggests that even though there are times it appears that courts look to some substantive aspects (for example non-discrimination and equality) of economic, social and cultural rights, they continue to limit the review of these rights by tying these aspects to the process of 26 Clough & Brazier op cit n 4 p141 27 Clements op cit n 4 p 684. 28 in fact she suggested that evidence would tend to disagree with that approach. 42 The range of literature and guidance on caring for individuals who suffer with incontinence would suggest that dignity is a key aspect in their care. 43 Although the applicant was continent, she was being treated as if she was not and as such it would seem that the guidance on incontinence care could be a starting point in evaluating the care. The difference between 'accepted practice' and 'expected practice' in health care is one which has been discussed in the context of negligence by Samanta. on to conclude that the 'applicant's personal feelings and desires had properly been balanced against the local authority's concern for her safety, and independence and respect for other care users.' 46 As such dignity appears to be viewed as an interest of no greater value than safety or independence.
Throughout the McDonald litigation the focus was on procedural aspects of decision making within finite resources, including a broad definition of needs as safety and privacy, with the standard of care being assessed as 'acceptable practice'. Ms Mc Donald's feeling of humiliation was acknowledged but the view appeared to be that her negative feeling towards the care would be temporary, as 'acceptable practice' suggested this feeling would change once she had tried the incontinence sheets.
Dignity was also associated with the efforts to involve the applicant in the decision making process. Rather than being viewed as a core value to which the courts should look it was viewed as an interest or right in the same way as autonomy and safety, and as such it seems it could be limited for the wider good in the context of finite resources. Lady Hale in her dissent does look to care standards in the context of a hospital or care home setting to identify whether the approach is acceptable, although she acknowledges that the same care is not possible in a community setting as it would be in a hospital setting. 47 The approach to both justiciability and dignity in the case is limited. It leaves questions as to what dignity ought to mean, as well as questions as to the approach that should be taken in law to dignity. 46 Ibid. Para 56 47 Ibid. Para 78 "The Care Quality Commission's Guidance, Essential Standards of Quality and Safety (2010), p 117 requires that people who use services have access to toilets, baths and showers that enable them to maintain privacy and dignity and are in close proximity to their living areas. The Commission's recent Review of Compliance at Ipswich Hospital NHS Trust found that dignity was not always sufficiently considered because people were not taken to a toilet away from their bed-space and commodes were used all the time: p 8."
Dignity: What does it mean?
Foster, although describing the concept of dignity as a 'slippery one,' argues that it is an important and useful concept, despite the criticism of it being vague. 48 In recent years the debate on the meaning of dignity has increased both in the context of law, and health care. 49 Often understanding of that concept begins with reference to end of life choices and palliative care. For example Jacobsen highlights that in bioethics, debates on dignity were embedded in the controversies of aspects related to care of the dying.
50
In law, Foster highlights that courts tended to look to the concept in 'hard cases', and argues that if the concept is applicable in such cases it can also have a wider relevance. 51 Foster views dignity 'as the transaction that constitutes the whole bioethical encounter.' 52 It is an approach which acknowledges that the concept arises in the interaction between individuals and groups: That is the individual is 'seen' as a person by those they are interacting with.
53
The 'transaction' approach taken by Foster is appealing in that it allows for the recognition of both subjective and objective aspects to the concept of dignity. The subjective aspect can be described in terms of the impact on the individual including feelings of humiliation, invisibility or exclusion, while the objective aspects can be viewed in the conduct towards to the individual and the standard of conduct expected by society to all individuals. The subjective aspect of dignity appears to equate to what in health has been described as 'personal or basic dignity' and in law as dignity 48 Réaume suggests a failure to respect human dignity is associated with 'prejudice, stereotyping and exclusion from benefits or opportunities.'
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Given the acknowledgment that ageism exists in health care provision it is unsurprising that failure to respect dignity is a recurring theme in reports and inquiries on health care provision involving older people.
92
It ultimately comes back to the value society places on the individual:
"the more important a particular benefit is to one's ability to participate fully in society, or the more it is a marker of true belonging in society, the more one should worry that exclusion from it will carry the connotation that members of the excluded group deserve less respect." obligations of respect protect and fulfill. 103 The second framework has been described as a useful tool to examine state policy, 104 and involves viewing state conduct in the context of questioning what should be made available and who has access. The literature also speaks of acceptability and quality, and sometimes affordability in relation to entitlements. However this chapter focuses on availability and accessibility, viewing the facets of acceptability, affordability and quality as aspects of that broader categorization. The overlap of these characteristics with the concepts of availability and accessibility can be seen in the context of the McDonald case. The care she wanted, the provision of carers to assist her in accessing toilet facilities during the night was not provided instead an alternate care package was provided, which was the supply of 'incontinence sheets'. The state view and indeed, the ECtHR view was that acceptable care was provided within available resources: the alternate view would be that there was no access to the necessary care, given that the care plan gave rise to questions of acceptability on the part of Ms McDonald. In assessing the right of access to care, including the quality of care, the court looked to affordability, and viewed the acceptability of the care from the perspective of the care provider only.
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The framework of availability and accessibility allows questions to be asked on how decisions are made as well as in respect to the impact of those decisions. General Article 12(2), which outlines broad programmatic areas of the right to health.
However given the breadth of the programmatic area, and the acknowledgement in
General Comment 14 of the broad definition of health the scope of the right is arguably determined by the impact on health. The focus of this chapter is dignity and the subsequent question is how is dignity associated with state obligations in respect of the right to health.
Three references are made to the concept of dignity in the main text of General Comment 14. 106 The right is described as the right to 'the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity' 107 suggesting that dignity is part of the definition of the right as well as a standard to be met. It also seems to be a prerequisite for realisation of the right, when the right to health is described as being dependent upon other human rights 'as contained in the International Bill of Rights', one of which is stated as 'human dignity'. 108 The third reference to dignity is found in the context of care for older people. The concept is associated with care which should 'maintain the functional capacities' of older people through preventive care as well as curative care. 109 It is not clear given the formulation of the statement if this is a general principle to be applied in respect of the right to health or is associated with the care of the terminally ill only. The rationale for an approach, which focuses on supporting the 'maintenance of functional capacities' appears to be associated with resources: the argument made is that over a longer time care will be less resource intensive. 110 Reference is also made to General Comment 6 on the economic, social and cultural rights of older persons, which in turn emphasizes the importance of the United Nations Principles on Older Persons 111 and which states "older persons should be able to live in dignity and security and be free of exploitation and physical or mental abuse, should be treated fairly, regardless of age, gender, racial or ethnic background, disability, financial situation or any other status, and be valued independently of their economic contribution"
112
General Comment 14 seems to suggest that dignity ought to be part of any rights approach, including a right to health approach. However, given the limited references to the concept it is difficult to identify what exactly that means within any right to health approach. One aspect is that dignity appears to be a part of the definition of a right to health ('the highest attainable standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity').
113
A second aspect raised in respect of older persons is that 'functional capacities' should be supported, although in the context it is discussed it appears to be about supporting and maintaining independence. The final three aspects to the concept in General Comment 14, are it is suggested, more in keeping with the traditional perspectives of dignity in law: (1) Rapporteur on dignity, which is worth stating in full, is that "older persons must be treated with as much dignity during the process of dying as they should have been in the early phases of their life course." 131 The statement highlights the development of the concept in approaches to end of life care. Although dignity seems to be acknowledged as a standard within the right to health, there is a need to develop understanding of that concept further not only in relation to care of the dying but also in respect of all aspects of care to enable a standard of health which is conducive to living a life in dignity.
The centrality of the concept of dignity to the right to health is reflected in a recent 'right to health assessment' of emergency health care by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. 132 Within the report the concept of dignity is frequently referred to, and is equated with a 'person-centred approach' to care 133 although the report suggests there is more to do to understand dignity when it states "There are, however, a number of gaps in the referencing of human rights in domestic law. The operational meaning of "dignity" is often lacking within both the Quality Standards and the PCE Standards. It is therefore difficult to ascertain how "dignity," including dignity in The research to develop the operationalization of the concept already exists if reference is made to existing case law and empirical research on health care practice, (although it is accepted that more needs to be done on this): Both research and case law can contribute to the understanding of dignity within 'a right to health' approach to health and social care. Cinneide describes as a 'normative steer' 136 in a way that would not create 'judicial overreach' 137 then greater consideration needs to be given to its meaning and application both within the international right to health jurisprudence and in the approach of the ECtHR and the domestic courts.
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